A Case for Humanity in the Law of Rape.

One of Irigaray’s most insistent criticisms of the operation of patriarchal law is its overwhelming focus on the protection of property at the expense of law that regulates relations between and amongst persons. This paper argues, with reference to Irigaray’s work, that the conceptual change involved in such a reorientation of law’s focus has important implications for the legal perception of the harm of rape and woman’s sexuality. The possessive paradigm operates in the law of rape by disassociating the harm of rape from its psychic and subjective impact and encouraging the ‘simple’rape/ ‘real’ rape dichotomy. In returning subjectivity to woman herself we can begin to see perhaps how the crime of rape involves a harm to woman that affects the whole of her being, and to be. Such a reading allows the law to perhaps move away from understanding rape as a violation of undifferentiated bodies to a violation of the innate ‘virginity’ of woman.

Thinking Sexual Difference Through the Law of Rape

2013 marks 10 years since the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was passed. That Act made significant changes to the law of rape which appear now to have made very little difference to reporting, prosecution or conviction rates. This article argues that the Act has failed against its own measures because it remains enmeshed within a conceptual framework of sexual indifference in which woman continues to be constructed as man’s (defective) other. This construction both constricts the frame in which women’s sexuality can be thought and distorts the harm of rape for women. It also continues woman’s historic alienation from her own nature and denies her entitlement to a becoming in line with her own sexuate identity. Using Luce Irigaray’s critical and constructive frameworks, the article seeks to imagine how law might ‘cognize’ sexual difference and thus take the preliminary steps to a juridical environment in which women can more adequately understand and articulate the harm of rape.

Rape is Different: Academic Impact Sinks to New Lows

The neo­lib­er­al­isa­tion of the uni­ver­sity could be under­min­ing dec­ades of pro­gress in com­batting rape myths

Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: 'Myths About Myths?'

In an article recently published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, the legal scholar Helen Reece argues that the prevalence and effects of rape myths have been overstated and the designation of certain beliefs and attitudes as myths is simply wrong. Feminist researchers, she argues, are engaged 'in a process of creating myths about myths' in a way that serves to close down and limit productive debate in this 'vexed' area. In this article we argue that Reece's analysis is methodologically flawed, crudely reductionist and rhetorically unyielding. We locate Reece's analysis within the wider theoretical field to show how her failure to engage with feminist literature on rape other than in the narrowest, most exclusionary terms, yields an approach which impedes rather than advances public understanding and panders to a kind of simplistic thinking which cannot begin to grapple with the complexity of the phenomenon that is rape. We conclude by emphasizing the continuing commitment of feminist researchers carefully to theorizing and (re)mapping the fraught field of progressive legal strategizing in order to identify and counter the kinds of risks and shortcomings of political activism with which Reece is rightly concerned.

Speaking Out Against Rape:Feminist (Her)Stories and Anti-Rape Politics

In 1976, Susan Brownmiller published 'Against Our Will', widely credited as the founding text of feminist anti-rape theory, in which she famously declared that rape was 'nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear'.While the scholarship and politics of Against Our Will have been subjected to numerous and compelling critiques, the work retains canonical and even foundational status within feminist anti-rape politics. In this article I attempt a critical re-examination of feminist (her)story telling practices. By situating the story told in Against Our Will beside and within Brownmiller's story of the creation of the book and her own coming-to-consciousness, a more general reexamination of the role of women's speech and (her)story-telling in feminist anti-rape politics is afforded. This re-reading draws out two central aspects of the politics of (her)story-telling which can be found in Brownmiller's work and in the Joan W. Scott quotation above. Firstly, the need to be recognised as a 'just source' of women's stories has resulted in the granting of epistemological primacy to stories of women's experience or personal statements. Secondly, the desire to compensate for the lack of a 'classical myth' to authorise women's claims, resulting in an attempt to imbue these feminist (her)stories with their own mythology.

How Does Justice Sound? Enunciative Modalities, Law’s Logos and Woman’s Voice

In the throes of her mimetic exposure of the lie of phallocratic discursive unity in 'Speculum of the Other Woman', Irigaray paused on the impossibility of woman’s voice and remarked that ‘it [was] still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.’ Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, she said, ‘they never have understood.’ (Irigaray 1985, 143).

That the law has never understood a uniquely feminine narrative is hardly controversial, but that this erasure continues to have real and substantive consequences for justice is a reality that feminists have been compelled to remain vigilant in exposing. How does the authority of the word compound law’s exclusionary matrix? How does law remain impervious to woman’s voice and how might it hear woman’s voice? Is there capacity for a dialogic engagement between woman, parler femme, and law?

This paper will explore these questions with particular reference to the experience of women testifying to trauma during the rape trial. It will argue that a logically linked historical genealogy can be traced through which law has come to posit itself as an originary discourse by which thinking is very much conflated with being, or in other terms, law is conflated with justice. This has consequences both for women’s capacity to speak or represent the harm of rape to law, but also for law’s ability to ‘hear’ woman’s voice and objectively adjudicate in cases of rape. It will suggest that justice requires law acknowledge the presence of two distinct and different subjects and that this must be done not only at the symbolic level but also at the level of the parole, syntax and discourse.

Response of farmland biodiversity to the introduction of bioenergy crops: effects of local factors and surrounding landscape context

The recent growth in bioenergy crop cultivation, stimulated by the need to implement measures to reduce net CO emissions, is driving major land-use changes with consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem service provision. Although the type of bioenergy crop and its associated management is likely to affect biodiversity at the local (field) scale, landscape context and its interaction with crop type may also influence biodiversity on farms. In this study, we assessed the impact of replacing conventional agricultural crops with two model bioenergy crops (either oilseed rape Brassica napus or Miscanthus × giganteus) on vascular plant, bumblebee, solitary bee, hoverfly and carabid beetle richness, diversity and abundance in 50 sites in Ireland. We assessed whether within-field biodiversity was also related to surrounding landscape structure. We found that local- and landscape-scale variables correlated with biodiversity in these agricultural landscapes. Overall, the differences between the bioenergy crops and the conventional crops on farmland biodiversity were mostly positive (e.g. higher vascular plant richness in Miscanthus planted on former conventional tillage, higher solitary bee abundance and richness in Miscanthus and oilseed rape compared with conventional crops) or neutral (e.g. no differences between crop types for hoverflies and bumblebees). We showed that these crop type effects were independent of (i.e. no interactions with) the surrounding landscape composition and configuration. However, surrounding landscape context did relate to biodiversity in these farms, negatively for carabid beetles and positively for hoverflies. Although we conclude that the bioenergy crops compared favourably with conventional crops in terms of biodiversity of the taxa studied at the field scale, the effects of large-scale planting in these landscapes could result in very different impacts. Maintaining ecosystem functioning and the delivery of ecosystem services will require a greater understanding of impacts at the landscape scale to ensure the sustainable development of climate change mitigation measures.

Who was Andrea? Writing Oneself as a Feminist Icon

This article explores the construction of Andrea Dworkin as a public persona, or a ‘feminist icon’, revered by some and demonized by others. It argues that in both her fiction and non-fiction, Dworkin engaged in a process of writing herself as an exceptional woman, a ‘feminist militant’ as she describes herself in the subheading of her 2002 memoir, Heartbreak. The article illustrates Dworkin’s autobiographical logic of exceptionalism by comparing the story told in Heartbreak to the story of Dworkin’s major novel, Mercy, which features a heroine, Andrea, who shares Dworkin’s name and significant biographical details. While Dworkin has insisted that Mercy is not an autobiographical novel, the author undertakes a reading here of Mercy as the story of Dworkin if she had not become the feminist icon of her own and others’ construction. In Mercy, Andrea unsuccessfully attempts to escape the silent, victimized status that Dworkin has insistently argued is imposed upon women. In her repeated victimization, Andrea functions for Dworkin as an ‘everywoman’ who both embodies Dworkin’s world-view and highlights how Dworkin’s own biography exists in tension with some of her central assumptions about women, gender and contemporary society.